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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, a wide array of federal programs has been developed to protect human health and the 
environment.  This trend began with the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970  and was rapidly followed by 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972  and numerous other statutes, most of which are aimed at specific 
environmental media, issues, or natural resources.   Over time these statutes have led in most cases to 
substantial improvements in environmental quality and protection.  One of the most notable success 
stories has been the CWA, under which point source  discharges of pollutants to the Nation's waters 
have been sharply curtailed.  The story is not so positive, however, for nonpoint source pollution, 
which is often referred to as polluted runoff.  Consequently, far too many of our Nation’s waters remain 
impaired.  Current efforts are underway to address these impaired waters through provisions of the CWA 
that require states to determine maximum pollutant loadings for each impaired waterbody ("total 
maximum daily loads" or TMDLs), and develop plans to reduce the loadings.  This is a time consuming 
and costly process that states have not readily undertaken.  The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) proposed guidance for implementation of the Act's TMDL requirements,  and is 
encouraging the states to address TMDLs and other water quality issues on a broad watershed basis.    
It is also considering the role that the trading of pollutant credits among dischargers can play in 
attaining water quality standards in impaired waters.
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Pollutant trading is a system which allows the discharger of a designated pollutant to reduce its 
discharge below whatever limits have been imposed upon it, and to sell the surplus thus created to 
another discharger.  The purchaser may then exceed its own discharge limits by the amount purchased.  
As explained below, typically dischargers with low control costs will choose to overcontrol and sell the 
excess credits thus created to dischargers with higher control costs.  Accordingly, trading should result 
in attaining the desired level of pollutant reduction at the lowest cost. 
Pollutant trading has garnered substantial attention in recent years, generated in large part by the sulfur 
dioxide (SO ) control provisions established in Subchapter IV of the Clean Air Act to control acid 
deposition.   Although there is some debate concerning the impact on overall SO  levels from actual 
trades, the program is usually credited with achieving substantial reductions in SO at costs well below 
those projected for traditional regulatory controls.  While the SO trading program was devised to 
address a single pollutant from Midwest power plants, pollutant trading has been implemented or 
suggested in an array of other situations, from trading of water pollutants  to wetlands mitigation 
banking.   Trading, however, may not be appropriate in many circumstances, and its application 
should be closely examined in each specific factual situation.
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Depending upon the manner in which the program is structured, a trading program may also run afoul of 
environmental regulatory programs.  Since the EPA is encouraging states to explore pollutant trading as 
a possible mechanism for implementing TMDLs, this article examines some of the issues which may 
arise in that context.  The article first summarizes CWA requirements relevant to TMDLs and outlines 
elements of an effective trading program.  It then examines the program recently established by the State 
of Connecticut to allow trading of nitrogen credits among sewage treatment plants on Long Island 
Sound to achieve an established TMDL, and the CWA issues presented.  Finally, it gives a brief 
comparison to the program being designed for the Chesapeake Bay, for which no TMDL has been 
established.  Current brief descriptive summaries of several often cited programs are appended.[13]
 OVERVIEW OF THE CWAII.
A. General
The CWA is the principal statute regulating the discharge of pollutants into U.S. waters.  The Act’s 
stated objective is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters."   Congress also declared it national policy that all waters be made safe for fishing 
and swimming, and that the discharge of pollutants into U.S. surface waters be eliminated.   To 
achieve these goals the Act establishes a framework for regulating the discharges of pollutants into U.S. 
waters.  The heart of this framework is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit program.   An NPDES permit authorizes the permittee to discharge pollutants subject to 
defined conditions and specific numerical limits.  Unless done in compliance with a federal or state 
permit issued under the NPDES program, the discharge of pollutants from a point source into U.S. waters 
is prohibited.
[14]
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Under the CWA, two types of standards, technology-based and ambient water quality based, are 
considered when setting discharge limits in an NPDES permit.  Technology-based effluent standards 
form the backbone of the CWA.  Under these standards, dischargers are required to meet treatment levels 
based on an evaluation of the capabilities of treatment technologies that are technologically and 
economically feasible in the discharger’s particular industry.   This technology-based treatment level 
is considered to be the baseline for dischargers and must be complied with regardless of the quality of 
the receiving water.
[18]
[19]
In contrast to technology-based standards that focus on the type of discharger, water quality standards 
(WQS) focus on the quality of the receiving water.  Established pursuant to Section 303 of the CWA, 
WQS dictate the quality that the ambient water in a particular lake, stream, or other body of water must 
achieve.   Section 303 of the Act requires states to designate water quality uses, such as fishing or 
recreational contact, and to set standards to protect those uses.   Section 303(d) of the CWA requires 
states to identify those waterbodies that, after implementation of the Act’s required technology based 
standards, still do not meet WQS (impaired waters) and to establish TMDLs for these waters on a 
prioritized schedule.
[20]
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A TMDL is a calculation of the maximum amount of a pollutant that a waterbody can receive and still 
meet water quality standards.  EPA regulations have gone further and define a TMDL as "a written, 
quantitative plan and analysis for attaining and maintaining water quality standards in all seasons for a 
specific waterbody and pollutant."   It must include “waste load allocations” (WLA), which are loads 
allotted to existing or future point sources, “load allocations” (LA), meaning loads allotted to existing 
and future nonpoint sources including loads from natural background, and a margin of safety to account 
for uncertainty.
[23]
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B. Importance of TMDLs
.  A point source is defined as a “discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”   Since its enactment, regulation 
under the CWA has focused, for practical and political considerations, on this type of discharge.  As a 
practical matter, it is simply easier to identify point source pollution and subject it to controls.  The 
application of technological controls to and the monitoring of such a source are relatively easy tasks.  In 
contrast, nonpoint source pollution is composed primarily of runoff and is caused by a wide range of 
activities occurring over large areas.  This diffuse nature of nonpoint source pollution leads to 
substantial problems in trying to impose regulatory controls.  Simply identifying the locus of nonpoint 
source pollution and quantifying its amount can be a challenge and is complicated by the fact that some 
polluting runoff occurs naturally.  Additionally, the relative percentage of natural (as opposed to 
manmade) runoff can vary according to season and weather condition, further compounding the 
problem.  
The Focus on Point Source Pollution
[25]
In addition to the practical problems, political opposition to nonpoint source control can also be a 
severe stumbling block to effective regulation.  Nonpoint source controls often involve restrictions on 
the use of land or methods of operation, and the political will to implement such measures may be 
lacking.
It is becoming increasingly clear that, absent effective control of nonpoint sources of pollution, 
achievement of CWA goals will not occur.  Despite the extensive efforts and measurable gains which 
have been made in the control of point source pollution, the U. S. General Accounting Office has 
reported that over one-third of state assessed waters do not meet water quality standards.   Nonpoint 
pollution is cited as the principal reason for these continued water quality problems.   
[26]
[27]
.  In 1999, the EPA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture issued 
the “Clean Water Action Plan” which identified watershed management as the key to controlling water 
pollution.   Watershed management involves examining all sources of water quality impairment 
within a defined water basin instead of viewing individual sources in isolation.  The TMDL is the basic 
tool of watershed management and must include loadings from both point and nonpoint sources.  
However, the decision of how to achieve the reductions is still difficult.  The use of pollutant trading 
programs has been suggested as a potential solution to the practical and political hurdles posed by the 
allocation requirements and the need to regulate nonpoint sources of pollution.
The Watershed Management Approach
[28]
III. TRADING PROGRAM ESSENTIALS
Pollutant trading is a market-based approach to environmental protection which seeks to attain specific 
environmental objectives while effectively lowering overall pollution control costs.  It is often offered 
as an alternative to traditional regulatory methods, but in fact usually relies upon them as a foundation.  
As noted, pollutant trading aims to take advantage of the differences in pollution control costs 
confronting dischargers of the target pollutant by allowing those dischargers that can achieve pollution 
reduction most cost effectively to sell their excess pollutant reduction capabilities to other eligible 
dischargers for whom reducing their own pollutant loads is more expensive.   By separating the issue 
of who will pay for controlling pollution from who will actually implement those controls,  trading 
is deemed to address complaints of rigidity and inefficiency in traditional regulatory programs.
[29]
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Trading programs must rely on three basic elements found in every market: a commodity to be traded, a 
demand for the commodity, and a structure in which trading can occur.   In a pollutant-trading 
scheme, the commodities to be traded are pollution discharge units, usually referred to as credits or 
allowances, that represent a defined amount of a pollutant expressed in terms of kilograms, pounds, or 
tons.   It is essential that the tradable units be quantifiable and that trades be verifiable to assure that 
actual pollutant reductions are achieved and that the environmental resource is protected.
[32]
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Once the trading program has been established, demand will be driven by the degree to which 
dischargers perceive that there will be potential cost savings from purchasing credits rather than 
installing controls.   Generally, there would be an incentive for a discharger to purchase credits if, by 
doing so, it could achieve the required pollution reduction at a price below its own control costs.  In 
other words, pollution trading becomes a less expensive option when compared to installing technology 
controls.  On the other hand, a discharger would be able to enter the market as a seller if its control costs 
were low and it could profit by generating excess saleable pollution reduction units.   The structure 
of a trading program will vary from program to program, but as previously noted it is generally 
grounded in an established regulatory program.  While there are "open" market programs which have no 
cap on the overall amount of pollution discharged or limit on the number of pollution units which may 
be traded, closed trading programs, generally referred to as "cap and trade," are the most common.
[34]
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In a closed trading program, the sources that may participate are specified by statute, regulation or other 
mechanism, and a regulatory agency or other entity sets a cap on the amount of pollutants that a 
watershed, air shed or ecosystem may absorb.  That cap may be either fixed for the life of the program or 
may become stricter over time.  Once the cap is set, it serves as a baseline for the trading program.  
Dischargers may be given individual limits or may be allocated a specified number of pollution units 
(allowances).  This enables them to produce surplus credits or allowances when they reduce their 
pollutant loads below the specified limit.  These surplus pollution units may be traded with other 
sources in the program, or may be "banked" for future use, depending on the program.  Usually no 
allocations are made for new sources, which must purchase unused allowances to gain market entry.  In 
this way, new sources will not affect the aggregate limit placed on the pollutant being traded. 
  IV. THE LEGAL AND POLICY BACKDROP
In 1996, the EPA published a Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading.   In this document, the 
EPA maintained its adherence to its enforcement and compliance responsibilities under the CWA
and spelled out a number of principles to guide pollutant trading.  Most importantly, the agency 
affirmed that trades must occur within constraints of the CWA.  More specifically, point sources must 
meet technology-based standards established under the Act; the trades must be consistent with 
attainment of WQS; trades must occur in the context of current regulatory (i.e., permitting) and 
enforcement mechanisms; and adequate opportunity must be provided for public participation.  The 
EPA also stressed that the boundaries of a trading program should generally coincide with watershed or 
waterbody segment boundaries.  This correlation of boundaries ensures that the environmental 
consequences of trades between parties occur in the same waterbody or stream/river segment, that 
boundaries are of manageable size, and are selected to prevent localized problems.
[37]
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As noted, the CWA essentially prohibits the discharge of pollutants into our Nation's waters unless done 
in conformance with a federal or state permit.  Standards are established to govern the issuance of 
permits, along with a regulatory scheme for implementing the program.  That scheme includes 
enforcement mechanisms and the opportunity for citizen input.  Under the CWA, emission limitations 
embedded in the NPDES permit can serve as the requisite standards.  Additionally, the flexibility 
inherent in the TMDL process can serve as one method of allocation under the watershed management 
approach.[40]
V. LONG ISLAND SOUND
A. Status of the Resource
Long Island Sound is an estuary of national significance.   It extends 110 miles from New York City 
eastward to the Atlantic Ocean off the northern tip of Long Island.   The Sound’s watershed 
comprises over 16,000 square miles in six states and Canada, including some of the most heavily 
urbanized areas in the country, with a population of almost eight and a half million people.   It is 
home to a great diversity of flora and fauna, and has an estimated annual value exceeding five billion 
dollars generated from commercial and recreational fishing, beach swimming, and boating.  The 
ecological integrity of the Sound, however, has been seriously damaged by human activity.  Fish 
catches are down, species diversity continues to decline, and the water quality is often severely 
impaired.  The states advise that swimming be foregone in certain areas after heavy rainfalls and that the 
consumption of local finfish be restricted.  In some areas shellfish beds have been closed since the 
1930s.
[41]
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Of the numerous pollution problems facing the Sound, the most prominent is the lack of dissolved 
oxygen (DO), a condition known as hypoxia.  Hypoxia occurs in parts of the Sound during the summer 
months as a result of over-enrichment of its waters by excess nitrogen.  Hypoxic conditions can have a 
deleterious impact on aquatic life, stressing organisms and threatening their survival.  The excess 
nitrogen which causes this problem is derived from numerous sources.  The primary contribution, 
however, is from the more than one billion gallons a day of treated effluent discharged by sewage 
treatment plants located on or close to the Sound.   Indeed, more than half of the total load of 
nitrogen delivered to Long Island Sound as a result of human activities is from these publicly owned 
treatment works (POTWs).   Hypoxic conditions do not occur uniformly throughout the Sound and 
tend to be most severe in its western end, the area of highest population concentration and sewage 
treatment plant loadings.
[45]
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B. Addressing the Hypoxia Problem
Like other point source dischargers, sewage treatment plants are required under the CWA to obtain 
discharge permits and to employ a specific level of technological controls,  and undertake even more 
stringent controls if necessary to prevent the impairment of local waters.   Most plants are not 
designed to remove significant levels of nitrogen, thus construction of new facilities or upgrades of old 
ones is often required.  The cost of improved sewage treatment can be extremely high, and both the cost 
[48]
[49]
of upgrades and of day-to-day operation and maintenance can vary with the age and condition of the 
individual treatment plant.  Moreover, the benefits to be gained in improved water quality in the Sound, 
especially the western Sound, from better sewage treatment may change according to the location of the 
particular plant.  
To address the hypoxia problem, the Long Island Sound Management Conference, in which 
Connecticut participates, initiated a multi-phased approach to nitrogen reduction.   Under Phase 
One, point and nonpoint loadings were frozen at 1990 levels.   Phase Two, which took effect in 
1994, required that low-cost nitrogen reduction actions be undertaken, consisting primarily of a series of 
modest sewage treatment plant retrofits using a variety of biological nitrogen removal technologies at 
selected facilities.   
[50]
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Phase Three, adopted in 1998, required that a TMDL for nitrogen be calculated for the Sound and that 
loadings in the basin be reduced in accordance with it.   The EPA approved the TMDL on April 3, 
2001.   The TMDL requires that the cumulative point and nonpoint nitrogen load of all in-basin
sources be reduced by 58.5% (specifically a 10% reduction in total non-point source load of nitrogen 
and a 63.5% reduction of point source discharges)  over a fifteen-year period with five-year 
incremental targets.   It was recognized, however, that even after these reductions have occurred, the 
state WQS for dissolved oxygen in the Sound would not be achieved.  Therefore, in addition to 
requiring a 58.5% reduction from in-basin sources, the TMDL also requires reductions in nitrogen from 
out-of-basin sources in Phase Four, and the implementation of non-treatment alternative technologies in 
Phase Five.
[53]
[54] [55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
C. Unique Features of the Long Island Sound TMDL
.  The TMDL for nitrogen in the Sound, like the overall Sound cleanup, adopted a 
phased approach to the attainment of WQS.  This method of TMDL development has been the subject of 
criticism by some who contend that the CWA’s requirement that TMDLs “be established at a level 
necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards”  does not allow for the achievement 
of WQS on an incremental schedule.  The EPA has, however, endorsed the phased approach in cases 
where a TMDL is developed under conditions of “high uncertainty” where the necessary data and 
predictive tools are inadequate to characterize and analyze the pollution problem.   Indeed, the 
Agency’s guidance document states that a phased approach is “required when the TMDL involves both 
point and nonpoint sources, and the allocation of waste loads to the point sources assumes 
implementation of non-point source controls.”   When a point source is given a less stringent WLA 
based on the assumption that nonpoint source load reductions will occur, the EPA requires reasonable 
assurances that the nonpoint source reduction will, in fact, happen.   When reasonable assurances are 
not possible the entire load reduction must be assigned to point sources.  In the case of the Long Island 
Sound TMDL, the phased approach includes monitoring requirements and a schedule for re-assessing 
TMDL allocations to ensure attainment of WQS.
The Phased Approach
[59]
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The TMDL approach assumes that 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont (upstream states that do not border the Sound but 
nonetheless contribute nitrogen through streams and tributaries) will also reduce both point and non-
point source nitrogen.   Nothing in the CWA authorizes one state to regulate the discharges of an 
upstream state, and EPA does not approve out-of-basin nitrogen reductions as formal allocations.   
Instead, when evaluating a proposed TMDL, EPA allows the state a certain amount of flexibility to 
make assumptions about improvements which it expects to see in water quality beyond 
its boundaries.   However, it is incumbent upon the state to explain clearly why such assumptions are 
reasonable when a TMDL relies on them.   Regarding Long Island Sound, EPA deemed the 
assumptions made regarding out-of-basin loadings reasonable.  EPA asserted its readiness to use its 
statutory and regulatory authority when issuing or overseeing NPDES permits to upstream dischargers.  
This assures that individual facility permits included nitrogen reductions sufficient to achieve the 
overall 25% reduction level.   Furthermore, EPA committed to working with Massachusetts, Vermont 
and New Hampshire to address non-point source nitrogen loads affecting the Sound.
Requirement of Nitrogen Reduction from Out-of-State Sources.  
[63]
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D. The TMDL's Trading Option
Non-point sources do contribute large amounts of nitrogen to Long Island Sound (LIS), but the most 
significant loadings come from point source discharges, particularly POTWs.   Accordingly, most of 
the nitrogen control burden falls upon these facilities.  As a result of their size, design, and operating 
costs, some POTWs are more cost-effective at removing nitrogen from their effluent than others.  In 
addition, a POTW’s location determines how its nitrogen load affects the hypoxic areas of the Sound, 
with those sources closest to the areas of hypoxia having the greatest impact.  Acknowledging these 
factors and recognizing that an effective trading program might provide significant cost savings for 
regulated entities, the LIS TMDL contemplated nitrogen trading among sources as a means for attaining 
the required nitrogen reduction.  In June 2001, the Connecticut legislature enacted Public Act No. 01-
180  which established the framework for a Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program (NCEP) for 
Connecticut sources.  Based on analysis by Connecticut's Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP), it was estimated that the NCEP exchange program would save Connecticut’s affected 
municipalities and its Clean Water Fund, which provides grants and low-cost loans for upgrades and 
new plant construction, $200 million in avoided capital construction costs over fifteen years.
[69]
[70]
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Although state officials originally anticipated that participation in the NCEP program would be 
optional,  the legislation is less than clear and seems to require that all POTWs be included in the 
program.   It directs that a statewide general permit for nitrogen be issued for all of the POTWs 
covered by the nitrogen TMDL, limiting the total amount of nitrogen these facilities are allowed to 
discharge and assigning each POTW an individual WLA based on the TMDL.   Each POTW will 
continue to have an individual state-issued discharge permit which covers other pollutants and 
conditions,  but will normally not contain a nitrogen limit.   The trading program differs from 
traditional regulatory programs by the manner in which compliance is achieved.  Participants in the 
trading program can meet their discharge limit in one of two ways: (1) by reducing their nitrogen 
discharges to an amount less than or equal to their allocated wasteload; or (2) by purchasing “nitrogen 
credits” equal to the amount that the POTW exceeds its allocation.   A nitrogen credit is the 
difference between a POTW’s annual WLA, as specified in the general permit, and the amount of 
nitrogen the POTW actually discharges.   Since the location of the plant affects the hypoxic 
conditions in the Sound, the DEP accounts for the differential impact by setting an “equivalency factor” 
for each plant.   The watershed had been divided into geographic management zones each of which 
has a different degree of influence on hypoxic conditions.  Within these management zones, tiers are 
established reflecting their distance from the Sound and the amount of attenuation of their pollutant 
load.   DEP uses these divisions in arriving at an equivalency factor reflecting the impact of each 
discharger on hypoxia in the Sound.  Multiplying the nitrogen credit by the equivalency factor for the 
plant results in an “equivalent nitrogen credit.”   
[72]
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The Act assigns to DEP the responsibility for administering the NCEP, and charges the agency with 
overseeing and executing all nitrogen credit exchanges.   Pursuant to the Act, DEP established a 
Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board, comprised primarily of state and municipal officials, to assist and 
advise it in carrying of the trading program.   
[82]
[83]
The Connecticut nitrogen trading program is a closed program, and banking of credits is not allowed.  
The DEP creates the market.  It must establish the value of equivalent nitrogen credits annually,  and 
is charged with buying and selling all of the credits.  The Act requires the DEP, on an annual schedule, 
to purchase all available nitrogen credits and sell credits to individual POTWs which need them to meet 
their nitrogen limits specified in the general permit.   Although the initial participants are the 79 
POTWs, whenever practicable, the DEP must sell any excess state-owned nitrogen credits to other public 
or private entities, not just POTWs.   Although the program has focused to date on point sources, its 
future expansion to include nonpoint sources is allowed.
[84]
[85]
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All trades are settled each calendar year.  The Act establishes time limits for the annual auditing of 
participating POTWs and for the completion of purchases and sales.   To ensure compliance, the Act 
subjects dischargers to the state’s general water pollution compliance and enforcement provisions.
[87]
[88]
E. Unique Aspects of the Trading Program
 A key component of the NCEP is an unusual state General Permit (GP) for Nitrogen The General Permit. 
Discharges, issued on January 2, 2002.  This establishes annual discharge limits, monitoring 
requirements, and reporting protocols for each of the 79 participating POTWs.   It allows, however, 
nitrogen trading between facilities in the program without the need for permit modifications.  These 
facilities, in aggregate, must reduce their annual loading of total nitrogen to Long Island Sound by 
approximately 63.5% by 2014 in order to achieve the final wasteload allocation established in the 
TMDL.   The permit contains increasingly stringent discharge levels over time, which anticipates 
that essentially all plants will eventually have to upgrade in order to meet those limits.  Those upgrades 
would depend, of course, upon the continuing availability of funds, something not necessarily reliable 
in today’s economic climate. 
[89]
[90]
.  It is evident that the Long Island Sound TMDL and its 
associated allocations of the nitrogen pollutant load provide opportunity for trading programs.  To 
assure that attainment of the TMDL is not threatened by shifts in allocations, the state is required to 
notify the EPA annually of any changes which have occurred in the WLAs as a result of reallocations or 
trading.  However, EPA does not intend to require that the TMDL be resubmitted to reflect revised 
allocations, as long as the changes result in equal or greater water quality improvements, taking into 
account the equivalency factors.   Furthermore, EPA specified certain types of reallocation that will 
not require the state to resubmit the TMDL.  They include trades between plants in the same tier in a 
management zone, or between plants in different tiers or management zones, as long as the appropriate 
equivalency factor is applied.  But reallocations between point and nonpoint sources, or between 
nonpoint sources in different tiers or management zones, will require the TMDL to be resubmitted.  In 
addition, a WLA may not be revised so as to cause localized adverse water quality impacts, such as low 
levels of dissolved oxygen.
Trading and the Need for Revised WLAs
[91]
[92]
F. Program Status
The Connecticut program began formal operation in January 2002.  For the first year of operation, the 
DEP, on the advice of its Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board, set the price of an equivalent nitrogen credit 
at $1.65.  This price reflects the composite cost of capital construction and operation and maintenance 
for nitrogen removal at twenty-three projects funded from Connecticut’s Clean Water Fund.   In early 
2003, the NCEB reviewed the 2002 nitrogen discharge levels of all seventy-nine participating plants 
compared to their permitted levels.  It then performed its clearinghouse function, reporting whether each 
plant would have to buy or sell credits depending on how well the facility did in relation to its permit.  
An invoice was provided to each POTW, and those purchasing credits are to do so by the end of July 
2003.  In August, the state will purchase credits from those designated as sellers. 
[93]
The 79 plants were almost equally balanced between sellers and buyers; however, the amount of credits 
created versus the number needed was fairly lopsided.  Almost $2.8 million in nitrogen credits were 
generated by plants, which reduced their discharges below permit levels.  However, plants that did not 
meet their discharge levels need only purchase a little over $1.3 million to be in compliance.  Since 
banking of credits is not allowed, the state is responsible for the balance of roughly $1.4 million.  At the 
time of this publication, the state is considering its options for funding this amount.   In spite of this 
problem, Connecticut officials are pleased that the program achieved significant reductions in nitrogen 
loadings to the Sound, and that they are ahead of the goals set in the TMDL.
[94]
[95]
Not surprisingly, the plants which were able to sell credits were mainly the twenty-three plants which 
had undertaken Clean Water Fund nitrogen removal projects.   The apparent reason for the relative 
imbalance between the number of credits created and those purchased is that many plants were able to 
implement some small capital improvements and/or reduce their discharges by better operation and 
maintenance.  If this is the case then there may be more demand for credits in subsequent years as the 
discharge limits are tightened.  
[96]
It is too early to determine whether the program will achieve its goal over the long term of economically 
reducing nitrogen loadings to Long Island Sound from Connecticut’s sewage treatment plants.  As a 
model, the program has a number of points to recommend it: it addresses a single pollutant; from a 
single type of discharger; within a single jurisdiction; and it is implemented on a watershed basis within 
the confines of the Clean Water Act's regulatory program, including the requirement that a TMDL be 
established and pollutant loads allocated.  However, it is somewhat complicated because of the 
exchange ratios which are employed due to the unequal impact of various plants on hypoxia in the 
Sound.  It also requires the state to administer the program, acting as the broker in all purchases, thus 
increasing transaction costs, especially if the state must buy a substantial number of unused credits each 
year.  Finally, although there has been public participation in the formulation of the program, and 
public comment was taken on the nitrogen general permit, it is not clear that citizens have any formal 
mechanism for challenging individual trades which they think endanger local water quality or otherwise 
are illegal.
In the final analysis, even if the program may work in the specific factual context in which it has been 
established, it is unclear what the lessons may be for other jurisdictions.  Certainly, it is fairly far from a 
classic free market, since the participants are all public agencies, the funding for capital construction of 
new projects comes in large part from state grants or loans for which the state sets the priorities, and the 
price at which pollution units are traded is fixed by the state.  
VI. CHESAPEAKE BAY
The Chesapeake Bay, America’s largest and most biologically diverse estuary, measures approximately 
195 miles in length and 35 miles at its widest point.   It boasts a watershed of 64,000 square miles, 
several times that of Long Island Sound and considerably more complicated both geographically and 
politically.  Like the Sound, the Bay’s drainage basin lies in a number of jurisdictions.  While only 
Maryland and Virginia actually border the Bay, Pennsylvania contributes substantial pollution through 
the Susquehanna River, the Bay’s largest freshwater source.  In addition, portions of Delaware, New 
York, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia lie within the watershed.   The Bay, which 
supports thousands of species of plants, fish and animals,  is a major breeding ground for some of the 
nation’s most valuable fisheries and produces 500 million pounds of seafood per year.  It is also a major 
resting ground along the Atlantic Migratory Bird Flyway, with a million waterfowl wintering in the 
Bay's basin each year.   An important recreational resource, the Bay is also a major economic 
resource.  Commercial fishing, tourism, and recreation-related industries provide jobs and contribute tax 
revenues to local economies.
[97]
[98]
[99]
[100]
[101]
The Bay has 5,600 miles of shoreline, and its tidal tributaries have an estimated 11,684 miles of 
shoreline, more than the entire West Coast.   Over 100,000 streams and rivers wind their way 
through the Bay’s vast watershed creating a spider’s web of interconnected waterways,  with 15 
million inhabitants living near them.   As a consequence of this geography, each river and stream 
acts as a conduit as they transfer the impact of activities in the surrounding communities to the Bay.
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A. The Nutrient Problem
Even though nutrients are essential for the health of the Bay and its many aquatic species, as in Long 
Island Sound, nutrient over-enrichment degrades Bay water quality.  Again the primary culprit is 
nitrogen, although phosphorous also plays a substantial role in some areas.  Excess nitrogen and 
phosphorous rob essential oxygen from the water column, resulting in seriously hypoxic
conditions.   [105]
Before European settlement, Chesapeake Bay’s watershed was heavily forested.  These forests and other 
undisturbed lands and wetlands absorbed and filtered the relatively small loading of nutrients.   
Farms, factories, cities, and suburbs have replaced much of these natural filters.  As land use patterns 
change and the watershed’s human population grows, the amount of nutrients entering the Bay’s waters 
has increased alarmingly, with roughly 331 million pounds of nitrogen and 20 million pounds of 
phosphorus reaching the Bay each year.   The majority of nutrients are the result of human 
activities, from such obvious sources as sewage treatment plants, septic systems, commercial lawn 
fertilizers and runoff from farms and fields.  Less obvious is the nitrogen pollution from vehicle exhaust 
and the chimneys and smokestacks of our homes, factories and power plants.   While Long Island 
Sound certainly suffers from similar pollution loadings, its hypoxia problem can be traced primarily to 
nitrogen from sewage treatment plants.  The primary sources of nutrient pollution to the Bay are more 
diverse, and may vary substantially from tributary to tributary.  Overall, however, agricultural runoff is 
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the largest source of nutrient pollution in the Bay watershed contributing forty percent of the nitrogen 
and fifty percent of the phosphorus entering the Chesapeake Bay.[109]
B. Addressing the Problem
The role of nutrients as a primary cause of poor water quality in the Bay was definitively established in 
1983, as the result of a multi-year research study aimed at identifying the major environmental threats to 
the Bay.   With the estuary’s health in danger, the jurisdictions surrounding the Bay decided it was 
time to take seriously the Bay’s condition and they formally agreed to work together on Bay restoration 
efforts.  Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, along with the District of Columbia, the EPA and the 
interstate Chesapeake Bay Commission signed the first Chesapeake Bay Agreement  and 
established a Chesapeake Bay Watershed Partnership to restore the Bay.   The goal of the 
Agreement was to improve and protect the water quality and living resources of the 
Chesapeake Bay;  it was amended in 1987 to include a specific commitment to attain a forty 
percent reduction in both nitrogen and phosphorous by the year 2000, to thereafter maintain that
level,  and to manage the Bay as an integrated ecosystem.   The focus of the effort became the 
development of region specific nutrient reduction plans called “tributary strategies.”   Tributary 
strategies are comprehensive plans designed to reduce nutrient pollution entering the Chesapeake Bay.  
Developed by state agencies, local governments, and the citizens living and working in their respective 
watersheds, the plans delineate how the forty percent reduction goal will be met, including actions 
taken by both point and non-point sources.
[110]
[111]
[112]
[113]
[114] [115]
[116]
[117]
Even though some significant improvements in water quality were achieved, as the 2000 deadline 
approached it became apparent that the goal of a forty percent reduction would not be met by existing 
tributary strategies.  And even if it could be met, the strategies did not address how the goal would be 
maintained in the face of increased sewage flows from future urban expansion and increased nutrient 
run-off from agricultural and from expanded livestock operations.   As a consequence, nutrient 
trading was seriously discussed as a means of achieving and maintaining the nutrient reduction goals, 
and a Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team reflecting the various Bay stakeholders was organized to 
explore the feasibility of establishing a trading program in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.   The 
team developed a set of fundamental principles which are generally consonant with EPA’s Draft 
Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, but contain at least three significant modifications.  First, 
sources should begin implementation of measures to achieve the 40 percent reduction goal before 
considering nutrient trading; and second, trading will only be allowed within each major Bay
tributary.   In addition, all trades must be subject to a permit or regulation or to an agreement that 
incorporates the equivalent protections and enforcement provisions of a permit or regulation.   The 
team also prepared guidelines that could be used by the Bay states to develop their own voluntary 
nutrient trading programs. 
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With guidelines in place the next step was implementation, and the key states (Maryland, Virginia, and 
Pennsylvania) began some movement toward developing plans for nutrient trading.  In Virginia, the 
legislature had already enacted a Water Quality Improvement Act that includes a clause requiring 
investigation of trading as a means to meet its goals.   The state turned to developing guidelines for 
market-based incentives, possibly to include trading, as part of its point source nutrient reduction effort, 
but has done little more.   Maryland unveiled a state nutrient trading proposal in September 2000, 
which provides for trading between point sources and between point and non-point sources.  The state, 
however, is not currently devoting resources to trading efforts,  and has recently required increased 
technological controls for POTWs.   In Pennsylvania, the EPA sponsored a project that simulated 
the effect of trading programs for several of its Bay tributary basins for which TMDLs have been 
developed, and the Pennsylvania legislature endorsed a resolution expressing interest in pursuing 
trading options.   In fact, the only serious nutrient trading effort under development in the 
Chesapeake watershed is in Pennsylvania  where EPA had funded a pilot trading project on the 
Conestoga River and demonstration trades are planned.
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Although the Bay Program’s fundamental trading principles provide a comprehensive programmatic 
framework for trading, no real trading programs exist in any of the states or at the Bay level, and none is 
being actively developed.  However, it is conceivable that this situation may change in the foreseeable 
future since the Chesapeake Bay program has set new nutrient levels for the tributaries, which may make 
the development of trading programs more attractive.[129]
C. Unique Aspects of the Chesapeake Bay Agreement
  In its efforts to address nitrogen pollution on Long Island Sound, Connecticut 
followed the traditional CWA regulatory approach by promulgating a TMDL and enacting legislation 
compelling compliance.   It then based its trading program on that regulatory framework.  In 
contrast, Chesapeake Bay officials chose to rely on negotiations among the different stakeholders 
outside of the regulatory framework, who voluntarily agreed to meet stated goals.   The difference 
in approaches can be traced in part to the nature of the watersheds and the pollution problems.  Hypoxia 
in the Long Island Sound results primarily from excess nitrogen discharged from sewage treatment 
plants, many of them located in Connecticut.  The obvious solution to the problem is to reduce the 
POTWs discharges.  Yet, effectively addressing hypoxia in the Bay necessarily entails the participation 
of not only multiple states, but also requires reductions from both point and non-point sources within 
those states.  Unfortunately, non-point sources are not regulated under the CWA, leaving Bay officials 
with little leverage. 
Voluntary/No TMDL.
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 Although the CWA required the establishment of water 
quality standards and TMDLs within a relatively short period, the EPA and the states essentially 
ignored this deadline for many years.   As noted earlier, TMDLs have been developed slowly, if at 
all, resulting in much litigation.   Environmental groups typically challenge the EPA or the states 
over the lack of TMDLs, arguing that the EPA has neglected its duty to promulgate TMDLs where the 
states have failed to do so.   Where TMDLs have been developed, environmentalists sometimes 
challenge their adequacy,  and dischargers may contest the conditions in their NPDES permits 
based on TMDLs.   By and large, the courts have accepted the environmentalists’ challenges and 
have ruled that the statute mandates the development of TMDLs.   While this would seem to require 
that a TMDL, or TMDLs, be established for the Bay and its tributaries, the EPA has not demanded their 
immediate development, and environmental groups have not pushed the issue.   Instead, the EPA is 
allowing the Bay states an opportunity to redefine and modify the standards by which the water quality 
impairment is determined before ordering a TMDL.  This is a crucial element of the Bay Program’s 
initiative, as some impaired waters will be removed because of new, less stringent standards.  If the 
Chesapeake Bay’s water quality is not restored by 2010, then a TMDL covering the entire 64,000 square 
mile Bay watershed is to be effective by 2011.
The Legality of the Voluntary Approach. 
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Long Island Sound and Chesapeake Bay are estuaries which share many common features and which are 
both plagued by a similar problem, excess nutrients which lead to reduced oxygen levels, and often, 
severe hypoxic conditions.  The approaches officials have selected to rectify this problem for each 
estuary differ substantially, based in part on technical as well as political differences.  Hypoxia in the 
Sound results largely from a readily identifiable and traditionally controllable point sources, sewage 
treatment plants.  With a smaller watershed and only two key states involved, officials have been able to 
establish a TMDL for the primary pollutant, nitrogen.  Because of strong interest on the part of 
Connecticut officials, a trading program has been developed and is underway.  The Chesapeake, by 
contrast, drains a much larger watershed, in a number of political jurisdictions, and has more 
complicated nutrient problems.  A large component of the excess nutrients comes from nonpoint 
sources, which are not easily controllable and traditionally have not been regulated.  These, among 
other factors, have impeded development of a TMDL for the Bay as a whole, and have led Bay officials 
to espouse a more voluntary approach to nutrient controls.  But without a TMDL to act as a market 
driver, trading seems to hold little attraction.  In both watersheds, the TMDL requirements have 
presented challenges and have affected the development of pollutant trading programs.
VII. TMDLS AND TRADING -- CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Considering the EPA's strong support and encouragement for pollutant trading programs in our quest to 
achieve water quality standards, it is likely that such programs will continue to proliferate.  But as 
demonstrated on the Sound and the Bay, the Clean Water Act’s TMDL requirement can present 
challenges when devising and implementing pollutant trading programs.  Nonetheless, TMDLs are not 
only legally required, but are critical for establishing a foundation upon which a trading program can be 
built.  Thus, it is necessary to understand the TMDL requirements, as well as how they may impact 
essential elements of a trading program.  The EPA asserts that any program must fit within the regulatory 
structure of the Clean Water Act; however, the agency at times liberally interprets provisions of the Act 
and its own regulations.  On Long Island Sound, the Agency allowed a TMDL to be phased in over time, 
and it blessed an unusual general permit.  On the Chesapeake Bay, it has given the states time to achieve 
water quality standards and to use trading to do so without imposing TMDLs until far in the future.  
In the long run, the success of a trading program will depend largely on whether the essential elements 
of a market are present and on the details of individual program implementation.  Of major concern for 
TMDL development and for trading programs, are the time and costs associated with researching and 
establishing TMDLs since this process may take a number of years and require millions of dollars.  Not 
only is the ability to develop an effective TMDL subject to the availability of funds, but it may also be 
influenced by the interests of the groups involved in its creation.  Both factors will affect how quickly 
trading programs can be put into place, and their effectiveness both in terms of encouraging potential 
participants as well as actually improving the water quality.  Two further project examples make the 
point.  First, in Wisconsin, a non-profit group is researching and developing TMDLs for major rivers and 
watersheds in the area.  The group estimates the task will take at least seven years and it is funded 
through grants and donations.   The research can only proceed according to the funds available.  
Second, in Colorado, the fifteen year-old TMDL for the Cherry Creek Basin is in need of updating, 
particularly since the original water quality standards were never achieved, and the Cherry Creek Basin 
Authority was charged with financing and researching the new TMDL.   The Authority’s board, 
however, consisted solely of local municipalities and water treatment plant representatives, who did not 
push for revision.   Eventually, the state legislature was compelled to step in to reassign board seats 
to ensure a broader group of interests were represented.   Both of these situations illustrate 
complications that may arise when TMDLs and trading efforts intersect.  Other points are raised in the 
programs included in the appendix.  
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Appendix:  Status of Several Well-Known Water Quality Trading Programs[145]
As noted in this article, the EPA has marketed trading as an environmentally and economically 
advantageous means to combat water pollution.  Premised on the air emissions trading program of the 
Clean Air Act, water effluent trading aims to provide incentives for polluters to take action by buying 
and selling in a free market.  In 1996, the EPA published a framework to facilitate the application of 
effluent trading for impaired water bodies and watersheds,  and has recently developed an effluent 
trading policy.   However, very few trades have taken place in all of the programs, even though 
some had been in place for many years.   Below is a brief update on the status of several of the most 
frequently cited trading schemes related to water pollution.
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Lake Dillon, Colorado[149]
Lake Dillon, a drinking water source for Denver and a recreational lake, was threatened with 
phosphorous pollution from many sources, especially related to increasing development.  The Lake 
Dillon effluent trading program for phosphorous is one of the oldest in the United States, established in 
1984, and was the first to allow trading between point and nonpoint sources.   Prior to 1999, there 
were only two trades under the program, which involved granting additional credits to a sewage 
treatment plant which replaced septic systems with sewers.   A more traditional trading scheme was 
not implemented until 1999, when a developer sought to expand a ski resort which would have 
increased loadings to the Lake.  In order to offset the increased loadings, the developer paid for a 
number of homes using septic systems to be connected to sewers.   Overall, the load allocation for 
the Lake has never been exceeded, in large part because there was a lower than expected growth rate in 
the surrounding communities, and the point source dischargers invested in state of the art technology 
designed to reduce the level of pollution.   The relative wealth of the area, supported by the resort 
economy, provides funding for the new technology.   Consequently, there has been little need for 
trading.  However, increased growth may change the demand for credits and the recent trade may 
indicate that a market will become active.
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Cherry Creek Basin, Colorado[155]
Trades to offset discharges have been allowed in this program since 1985, and a basin-wide trading 
program was implemented in 1997 which allows trading within the framework of a TMDL.   
However, only ninety pounds of phosphorous have been traded and the load allocation has not changed 
since it was established fifteen years ago.  The TMDL established at the time was generous in order to 
accommodate future development, but the waters of Cherry Creek Basin have never attained water 
quality standards.  The original Cherry Creek Basin Authority was only comprised of local governments 
and municipal dischargers; it was recently reconfigured by the state legislature to reflect a wider array of 
interest groups.  A new TMDL is now being researched for the basin, but it will not be completed for 
several years.  Furthermore, there is concern over how to promote participation among non-point sources 
since participation remains voluntary.
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Tar-Pamlico Basin, North Carolina[157]
This program was initiated in 1990, and its rules for trading were established in 1992.  The point 
sources, primarily sewage treatment plants, are grouped together in an association which is subject to a 
cap set by the state.  The point source dischargers may trade among themselves, but if they exceed the 
collective nutrient loading cap the association must offset those discharges by payments to the state’s 
agricultural cost share program.  The payments are to be used to secure nutrient reductions from 
nonpoint sources in the Tar-Pamlico Basin through the use of best management practices.  Since the 
program’s inception, no true trades have taken place in the basin because the point source load caps 
have not been exceeded, point sources having improved their efficiencies either through capital 
improvements or operational changes.  Nevertheless, the association purchased credits to bank for future 
needs, using for the most part an EPA grant.  The purchases funded a substantial amount of agricultural 
best management practices.   However, some of the funds were used to pay for administrative costs, 
and not for actual pollution reduction practices.  When the second phase of the program was established, 
environmental groups which had been involved in its original development objected that the nutrient 
reduction goals being set were too generous.  For that and other reasons, they withdrew from the 
program.   New rules for non-point sources, including farms and municipal storm water, went into 
effect in September 2001, after intervention by the legislature at the behest of farm interests.   
Although agriculture is subject to an overall reduction goal, and farmers must register with local 
advisory committees formed to facilitate the process, it is not clear how the installation of necessary 
nutrient reduction practices will be financed.   The farm community is supportive of trading when it 
provides money for agricultural best management practices, but is concerned about additional 
regulation of agricultural activities.   The loading caps will be reevaluated in Phase III of the Basin 
program, which begins in 2005.
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Fox River-Wolf River Basins, Wisconsin[164]
The Fox River was the first waterbody for which pollutant trading was proposed, in 1981.  It was not 
until 1995 that a trade occurred.   Trading pilot programs were established in 1997 for the entire 
Fox River-Wolf River basin, but no trades were conducted during the pilot because all but two point 
source dischargers were able to achieve their required goals through technology controls.  The two non-
compliant dischargers were allowed exceptions to their limits due to economic hardship.  Sixty to 
eighty percent of the loads come from non-point sources, but there are no regulations requiring farmers 
to abide by the load limits and farmers have been reluctant to discuss trading options.  Fox-Wolf Basin 
2000, a nonprofit organization, is currently writing a TMDL that will be completed in five years.   
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources concluded that the economy and the lack of a 
regulatory driver were the main factors in the lack of trading activity.
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What Happened to Trading?
Many existing water pollutant trading programs do not appear to be particularly effective, and often do 
not operate within the context of a TMDL.  Indeed, some cannot be called true market trading programs, 
since they rely heavily on state intervention and funding.  The Long Island Sound and Tar-Pamlico 
programs would seem to be good examples.  However, several other trading programs are being 
developed which show promise, and which address the TMDL requirements.  For example, in Idaho the 
Lower Boise Effluent Trading Program is tackling the reluctance to develop TMDLs by designing a 
flexible permitting process where a permit does not have to be rewritten with every trade.   
Michigan has made substantial progress in devising a statewide voluntary program.  The Department of 
Environmental Quality issued rules in 2002 which allow trading in any watershed in the state, as long as 
certain requirements are met, including compliance with the federal Clean Water Act.
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In some cases, technology investments by point source dischargers have resulted in substantial 
reductions in pollutant loadings and, as a result, have eliminated a demand for trades.  Even though 
existing programs are wrestling with developing new TMDLs that deal more aggressively with the 
nutrient loadings in their waters, nonpoint sources, which account for the majority of the loads in most 
areas, create significant problems.  Some problems frequently cited by current program administrators 
are that limited incentives may exist for nonpoint sources to participate; cultural barriers and mistrust 
can undercut voluntary participation among interest groups such as agriculture; the TMDL process is 
lengthy and expensive; and it is often time consuming and difficult to gain political acceptance for 
trading.  Finally, the Clean Water Act does not provide a legal framework to deal with nonpoint source 
pollution, so there is no market driver for those sources.
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Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice:  Los Angeles’ 
Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy
elling Pollution, Forcing Democracy Too Much Market? 
Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the ''Polluter Pays'' Principle
See Water Quality Trading – An Innovative 
Approach to Achieving Water Quality Goals on a Watershed Basis: Hearing Before the House Comm. 
On Transp. & Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env’t th
available at http://
www.house.gov/transportation/water/06-13-02/steinzor.html
Whatever its flaws, even those who criticize it as inefficient concede that a traditional regulatory 
approach may be preferable in certain situations, such as when pollutants have local impacts, or where 
the sources are too few to provide a competitive market.  Hahn & Stavins, note 29, at 14-15.  In 
Hahn's and Stavins' view, the best set of pollution control policies will involve a mix of market 
mechanisms and traditional regulatory measures. . at 15. 
supra 
Id
 Kurt Stephenson & Leonard Shabman (Virginia Water Resource Research Center), 
, Water Science Reporter 2 (Oct. 1996).
[32] See Effluent 
Allowance Trading: A New Approach to Watershed Management
 Water pollutant trading may be referred to as effluent trading or water quality trading.[33]
 Office of Water, U.S. EPA, Pub. No. EPA 800-R-96-001, Draft Framework for Watershed-Based 
Trading (1996),  [hereinafter Draft 
Framework].  Optimally, all sources would control to the same marginal cost level, that is, the additional 
or incremental costs of achieving one additional unit of pollution reduction would be equal.   Hahn 
& Stavins,  note 29, at 6.   EPA, Long Island Sound Study, Comprehensive Conservation and 
Management Plan 1, 2 (1994) [hereinafter LISS CCMP], 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).  
[34] See
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framwork.html
See
supra See
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/
watershed/summary.html
 Hahn & Stavins,  note 29, at 6; Emissions Trading,  note 29, at 16; Robert W. Hahn 
& Gordon L. Hester, , 16 Ecol. L. Q. 361, 364 
(1989); Esther Bartfeld, , 23 
Envtl. L. 43, 56-57 (1993).
[35] See supra supra
Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice
Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings
 The acid deposition control provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S. C. §§ 7651-7651o (2002), are 
of this nature, as well as all of the existing water pollutant trading programs.
[36]
 Draft Framework,  note 34.[37] supra
Executive Summary 2[38] Id. at .
[39] Id.
 For a fuller discussion of the Draft Framework and the legal principles involved,  Powers, 
note 13.
[40] see supra
 Indeed, the LIS rates its own section in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1269, as does the 
Chesapeake Bay, 33 U.S.C. § 1267.
[41]
 LISS CCMP,  note 34, at 3.[42] See supra
[43] Id.
 Peter L. Sattler,  Sound Update, Winter/Spring 2003, at 6.  [44] Surf’s Up – Is it Safe? 
LISS CCMP,  note 34, at 4; LISS, Summary of the Comprehensive Conservation and 
Management Plan, at 6 (1994) [hereinafter LISS CCMP Summary].
[45] supra
 LISS CCMP,  note 34, at 20. [46] supra
 The hypoxia problem caused by excessive discharges of nitrogen is exacerbated by the natural 
tendency of the waterbody to stratify during the warmer summer months. The fresher water on the 
surface is warmer but contains more oxygen than the lower layer, which is denser and saltier. This 
phenomenon creates a density difference called a pycnocline, which prevents mixing of the surface and 
bottom layers which would otherwise occur and bring oxygen to the lower level. LISS CCMP,
note 34, at 16-18; LISS CCMP Summary,  note 45, at 12.
[47]
supra
supra
 For sewage treatment plants this is referred to as "secondary treatment."  Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(1)(B).
[48]
. § 1311(b)(1)(B).  S § 1314(d).  Sewage treatment plants typically are designed to treat the 
types of pollutants found in human waste, which include biochemical oxygen demanding pollutants 
(BOD) such as nitrogen, along with suspended solids (SS), and the potential of hydrogen (pH). 
Secondary treatment is defined by EPA regulations as a removal rate of at least 85% for BOD and SS.  
The 30-day average may not exceed 30 milligrams/liter, and the 7-day average may not exceed 45mg/l. 
40 C.F.R. 133.102(a),(b). The pH of the discharge must be between 6.0 and 9.0. 40 C.F.R. 133.102(c).
[49] Id ee also 
 The Long Island Sound Study got underway as the result of a congressional appropriation for EPA [50]
and the coastal states of Connecticut and New York to assess the water quality of the Sound.  LISS 
CCMP,  note 34, at 5.  Following enactment of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, Long 
Island Sound was selected to participate in the National Estuary Program, forming the Long Island 
Sound Study Management Conference, which included federal, state, and local officials, representatives 
of industry, public interest groups, and academic institutions.  S  Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1330(c) 
(2002).  The Conference was charged with gathering data and assessing the condition of the estuary, 
identifying the causes of environmental problems, and developing a Comprehensive Conservation and 
Management Plan to recommend priority corrective actions and compliance schedules to address those 
problems.  . § 1330 (b).   LISS CCMP,  note 34, at 27-45.
supra
ee
Id See supra
 The states agreed to achieve this "freeze," through various permit modifications and facility 
retrofits.  LISS CCMP,  note 34, at 27-29.
[51]
supra
. [52] Id
 Conn. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., A Total Maximum Daily Load Analysis to Achieve Water Quality 
Standards for Dissolved Oxygen in Long Island Sound (2000) [hereinafter LIS TMDL].   Conn. 
Dept. of Envtl. Prot, , 
 (last visited June 24, 2003).
[53]
See also
The Long Island Sound TMDL available at http://www.dep.state.ct.us/wtr/lis/
nitrocntr/tmdlfs.pdf
 EPA, Long Island Sound Office, EPA New England and EPA Region 2 TMDL Review (Apr. 3, 
2001) [hereinafter EPA TMDL Approval].  The TMDL uses a maximum annual load rather that daily 
load limits, since hypoxia in the Sound is not sensitive to daily or short-term nitrogen loadings.  LIS 
TMDL,  note 53, at 39.
[54]
supra
 Pollutants originating in the Connecticut and New York portions of the Sound’s drainage basin are 
referred to as in-basin.  Pollutants from sources outside that area, including northern tributaries, the East 
River or the ocean are designated as out-of-basin.  LIS TMDL,  note 53, at 11.
[55]
supra
 Point sources contribute roughly 39,000 tons of nitrogen to the Sound a year.  at 14.[56] Id.
 Those targets are: [57]
August 2004, first 40% of the 58.5% reduction (i.e., 23.4% of total load) = 9,534 tons/yr, removed. 
August 2009, total of 75% of the 58.5% reduction (i.e., 43.9% of total) = 17, 876 tons/yr, removed.
August 2014, 100% of the 58.5% reduction = 23,834 tons/yr, removed.
 LIS TMDL,  note 53, at 35-37.  Federal regulations provide that if technology-based treatment 
requirements applicable to the discharge are insufficient to achieve the standards,  use of non-treatment 
alternatives to achieve WQS is permitted on a case-by-case basis. 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(f) (2002).  However, 
the burden is on the discharger to demonstrate that the technique is preferable to others such as 
advanced wastewater treatment or recycling and reuse. 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(f)(3) (2002).  Even after 
imposing advanced treatment requirements on point sources and pursuing aggressive nonpoint source 
reduction plans, Long Island Sound water quality models indicate that the WQS for dissolved oxygen 
will not be attained in all portions of the Sound.  As a result, alternative technologies are under 
consideration as methods of achieving the TMDL.  They include: (1) altering the basin morphology of 
the Sound; (2) constructing artificial wetlands; (3) mixing/aerating bottom waters; (4) relocating sewage 
treatment plant outfalls; (5) establishing seaweed farms; and (6) installing tidal gates. LIS TMDL, 
note 53, at 35-37.
[58] supra
supra
 Clean Water Act § 303(d)1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2001).  [59]
 U.S. EPA, Pub. No. 440/4-91-001, Guidance For Water Quality Based Decisions: The TMDL 
Process,  (last visited on Apr. 19, 2002) 
(hereinafter TMDL Guidance).
[60]
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/decisions/
[61] Id.
[62] Id.
LIS TMDL,  note 53, at 43; EPA TMDL Approval,  note 54, at 16;  VI.B.2.[63] supra supra see infra
 EPA TMDL Approval,  note 54, at 8.[64] supra
 at 9.[65]Id.
[66] Id.
. at 12.[67] Id
. at 16.[68] Id
 LISS CCMP,  note 34, at 27-45.[69] supra
 An Act Concerning Nitrogen Reduction in Long Island Sound, P.A. 01-180, 2001 Conn. Legis. 
Serv. P.A. 01-180 (S.S.B. 1012) (West) [hereinafter Conn. Nitrogen Reduction Act], 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[70]
available at http://
www.cga.state.ct.us/2001/act/Pa/2001PA-00180-R00SB-01012-PA.htm
, 107  Cong., 2d Sess. (June 13, 2002) (testimony of Thomas Morrissey, Director, 
Planning & Stds. Div., Water Mgmt. Bur., Conn. Dept. Envtl. Prot.), 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).  The savings would accrue 
primarily because some facilities may find it less expensive to purchase credits than to fully upgrade for 
nitrogen removal. 
[71] See Water Quality Trading – An Innovative Approach to Achieving Water Quality Goals on a 
Watershed Basis: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Transp. & Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Water 
Res. and Env’t th
available at http://www.house.gov/
transportation/water/06-13-02/morrissey.html
 Email communication with Lee Dunbar, Conn. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 21, 2003) (on file with 
author).
[72]
 Conn. Nitrogen Reduction Act § 2.[73]
Although a POTW might conceivably wish to opt out of the program, it is not clear that the law 
permits that.  And practically speaking, it is unlikely that such a request would be made since the plant’s 
individual permit would then have to include a nitrogen limit based on the TMDL and would be 
effective on issuance, rather than phased in over time.  Email communication with Lee Dunbar,
note 72.
[74] Id.  
supra
 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-430 (2001) (permit for new discharge).[75] See
 Individual permits will only include nitrogen limitations when the discharge of ammonia nitrogen 
must be curtailed to protect against impairment of the receiving water.  Email communication with Lee 
Dunbar,  note 72.  
[76]
supra
 Conn. Nitrogen Reduction Act § 4(c)(2).[77]
 § 1(8).[78] Id.
 § 4(b)(3).  Establishing the ratio at which pollutant units from various sources or locations have 
an equivalent environmental impact may often be a necessary step in developing a trading program.  For 
a summary of trading ratios in several programs,  Chesapeake Bay Program, Nutrient Trading 
Fundamental Principles and Guidelines 2-3, EPA 903-B-01-001, CBP/TRS 254/01 (Mar. 2001) 
[hereinafter Fundamental Principles], 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[79] Id.
see
available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/subcommittee/
nsc/final15guidancedoc.pdf
 LIS TMDL,  note 53, at 12.[80] supra
Conn. Nitrogen Reduction Act § 1(2) (2001).[81]
 § 3.  [82] Id.
 § 3(a).[83] Id.
 § 4(b)(9).[84] Id.
 §§ 4(b)(8), (9).[85] Id.
 § 4(b)(10).  Selling credits to other entities would expand the program and reduce the financial 
burden on the state.  
[86] Id.
 §§ 4(c)(1), (2), 5.[87] Id.
 Conn.Gen. Stat. § 22a-416 (2001).[88]
 Conn. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 
 (Sept. 2001) (fact sheet), 
.  Although EPA approved the general permit there is some question whether it 
fully comports with Clean Water Act statutory and regulatory requirements.   Testimony of Nancy 
Stoner, Natural Resources Defense Council, on Proposed General Permit for Nitrogen Discharges into 
Long Island Sound, October 24, 2001 (on file with author).  The Clean Water Act requires that a 
facility’s permit contain water quality based limits, § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C), and 
general permits are only authorized by the Agency when all of the dischargers “[r]equire the same 
effluent limitations.”  40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii)(B) (2002).
[89] Connecticut’s Nitrogen Control Program: General Permit for Nitrogen 
Discharges available at http://www.dep.state.ct.us/wtr/lis/
nitrogengp/ngpfs.pdf
See
   LIS TMDL,  note 53, § VII.[90] Id. See also supra
EPA TMDL Approval,  note 54, at 11.[91] supra
[92] Id.
 Telephone Interview with Lee Dunbar, Conn. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 11, 2003) (on file with 
author).
[93] See
.[94] See id
.  The plants achieved a collective reduction 15 percent below the limit set by the general 
permit.  Environmental Trading Network, , at 
4,  (last visited Apr. 19, 2003) 
[hereinafter ].
[95] See id
Draft, March 5, 2003 Conference Call Summary
available at http://www.envtn.org/calls/march2003call.PDF
March 5, 2003 Conference Call
 The plant generating the most credits was New Haven East, with $624,413.  The largest purchaser 
was Danbury, at $272,602.  Conn. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., LIS Total Nitrogen Credit Exchange: Final 
Balance–2002,  (last visited June 24, 
2003).  
[96]
available at http://www.envtn.org/docs/ct_Nbalance_table.PDF
 Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2003) 
[hereinafter ].
[97] The Chesapeake Bay: General Bay Facts, available at http://
www.cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resources_facts_bay
General Bay Facts
 Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
,  http://www.cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resources_facts_general (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2003) Chesapeake Bay Program, , 
[98]  CBF Fact Sheet: General Information About Chesapeake 
Bay available at
.  See also About the Bay at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
Chesapeake Bay Program, , note 111
  (last visited Apr. 19, 2003); Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
, 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
info/about.cfm The Land's Effect on the
Bay: What is a Watershed, Anyway? available at http://www.cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=
sotb_2001_land_watershed
note 97.[99] See General Bay Facts, supra 
. [100] Id
. [101] Id
. [102] Id
. [103] Id
. [104] Id
 Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
, 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[105] Water Pollution in the Chesapeake Bay: Too Much Nitrogen Is Bad 
for Bay available at http://www.cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resources_facts_water_pollution
[106] Id.
[107] Id.
.[108] Id
  Although nonpoint sources of pollution do dominate in the Bay, sewage treatment facilities 
contribute a significant amount of nutrient pollution.  The Bay watershed has 288 major wastewater 
treatment plants.  Wastewater treatment plants contribute 61 million pounds of nitrogen to the Bay each 
year.  Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
,
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[109] Id.
Reducing Nitrogen and Phosphorus Pollution from Wastewater 
Treatment Facilities  available at http://www.cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=
resources_facts_nutrient_red_ww
 Chesapeake Bay Program, A Work in Progress - A Retrospective on the First Decade of the 
Chesapeake Bay Restoration 2 (1998). 
[110]
 Chesapeake Bay Program, , 
  A short summary of the various Bay agreements is found in 
Fundamental Principles,  note 79, at 2-3.
[111] 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement available at http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/199.pdf.
supra
 Chesapeake Bay Program, , 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[112] Chesapeake 2000 available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
agreement.htm
[113]
1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement  supra .
 Chesapeake Bay Program, , 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).  The 
baseline for the reduction is 1985 levels of the two pollutants. 
[114] 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement available at http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/1987ChesapeakeBayAgreement.pdf
[115] Id.
Chesapeake Bay Program, ,
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003); 
Chesapeake Bay Program,
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[116] Chesapeake Bay Agreement: 1992 Amendments available at http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/1992ChesapeakeBayAmendments.pdf
 The 40% Nutrient Reduction Goal, available at http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/info/nutr2.cfm
 Karl Blankenship, , 13 Bay J. 1, 1 (2003),
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
 Chesapeake Executive Council, Joint Tributary Strategy Statement, Directive No. 93-1 
(1993),
(last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[117]
available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/../pubs/DirectivesAgreementsandAmendments.pdf
 Fundamental Principles,  note 79, at 3.[118] See supra
. at i[119] Id
. at 15-16.[120]Id
. at 27, 29.[121] Id
. at 7.[122] Id
. at 6.[123] Id
 Great Lakes Trading Network, ,
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[124] Draft, Sept. 25, 2002 Conference Call available at http://
www.envtn.org/calls/sept2002call.PDF
,  note 95, at 2.[125] March 5, 2003 Conference Call supra
H.R. Res. 361, 2000 Sess.  (Penn. 2000) (enacted), 
; Fundamental Principles,  note 79, at 7.
[126] available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/
WU01/LI/BI/BT/1999/0/HR0361P2946.HTM see supra
[127]
See Is it Time for a Trade for the Bay? available at http://
www.bayjournal.com/03-03/trading.htm
 Press Release, EPA, EPA Releases Innovative Approach to Cleaner Water (Jan. 2003), 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003);  EPA, 
Office of Water, , 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).  The agency has also funded development 
of an internet-based marketplace for nitrogen trading in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.  
,  note 95, at 1-2.
[128] See at http:/
/yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/
7f1b0616de4dc2a285256cad006a60a7?OpenDocument see also
Water Quality Trading Projects http://www.envtn.org/
docs/EPA_kickoff_projects.PDF
See also March 
5, 2003 Conference Call supra
     Chesapeake Bay Program, 
,  (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2003)
[129] See id. See also Chesapeake Bay Program Announces New Nutrient 
Reduction Goals to Restore the Bay at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/nutrientreduction2003.htm
.
 Part II.[130] See supra
 Fundamental Principles,  note 79, at 3.[131] See supra
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (2002) (amended 1972).[132]
, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Carol Browner, then 
EPA Administrator, acknowledged in congressional testimony that TMDLs had not been given the same 
priority as implementing the general pollution control regulations of the CWA).  
[133] Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fox
 note 6[134] See supra .
 Litigants have argued that the EPA has violated Sections 706(1) and 706(2)(A) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act by approving inadequate or inappropriate TMDLs, or by approving 
extended timetables for submissions.  When states that have been delinquent in submitting TMDLs 
plaintiffs have often sought to have the court find that there has been a constructive submission.  The 
[135]
constructive submission argument has failed where there is evidence of some affirmative steps taken to 
submit TMDLs, even if that amounts to only one or two submissions.  
, 939 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996); , 93 F. Supp. 2d 531 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  , 84 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
1999) (EPA’s duty to promulgate TMDLs for state triggered where there has been only one TMDL 
submitted in eighteen years); , 54 F. Supp. 2d 621 (E.D. Va. 
1999).  Where the constructive submission doctrine failed, the APA claims were usually successful.  
, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Mont. 2000) (CWA 
imperative was for quick development of TMDLs as evidenced by the short deadlines implicit in the 
statutes; thirteen years of inactivity clearly violated this imperative).  
, 939 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (EPA’s approval of a schedule for the submission of 
TMDLs was arbitrary and capricious because it would take Georgia one hundred years to comply with 
the CWA).
See generally Sierra Club v. 
Hankinson Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fox
But see generally Kingman Park Civic Association v. EPA
American Canoe Association, Inc. v. EPA
See 
generally Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.
See generally Sierra Club v. 
Hankinson
. , 939 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (challenging 
Georgia’s TMDLs because they do not establish daily loads and they ignore seasonal variations as 
required by the CWA.); , 147 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (plaintiffs contend water quality report submitted and approved does not meet the statutory 
definition of TMDLs; seasonal measurement of loads and phased reduction plan
violate statute); , 268 F.3d 91 (2  Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs sought 
judicial review of EPA’s decision to approve TMDLs for eight New York reservoirs where annual loads 
were substituted for daily loads).
[136] See generally, e.g , Sierra Club v. Hankinson
San Francisco Bay Keeper, Inc. v. Browner
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski d
, 115 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (industry 
groups challenged EPA published guidance for Great Lakes, including total maximum daily loads, as 
arbitrary and capricious).
[137] See generally, e.g., American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA
 Several recent decisions, however, hold that past noncompliance is irrelevant and stress the 
discretionary power of the EPA.  As long as some affirmative steps have been taken to submit TMDLs, 
such as a memorandum of understanding or a schedule of submission, the courts have declined to find 
the EPA has violated any non-discretionary duty.  , 93 F. 
Supp. 2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), , 147 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001); , F. Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2001).
[138]
See generally Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fox
San Francisco Bay Keeper, Inc. v. Browner
Sierra Club v. EPA.
 EPA's recently proposed Water Quality Trading Policy Statement specifically requires the "[a]ll 
water quality trading should occur within a watershed [for which a trading program has been 
established] or a defined area for which a TMDL has been approved."  
,  note 11.
[139]
Final Water Quality Trading 
Policy Statement supra
EPA, ,
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[140] See Restoring Bay Water Quality Taking a Cooperative Approach available at http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/info/wqcriteriatech/index.cfm
 Telephone Interview by Kirstin Etela with Linda Stoll, Executive Director, Fox-Wolf Basin 2000, 
Appleton, Wis. (Nov. 16, 2001) (on file with author); Telephone Interview by Kirstin Etela with Dick 
Parachini, Colo. Dep’t of Public Health and Env’t, Water Quality Control Div., Denver, Colo. (Nov. 16, 
2001) (on file with author).
[141]
 Telephone Interview by Kirstin Etela with Dick Parachini, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health and Env’t, 
Water Quality Control Div., Denver, Colo. (Nov. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
[142]
.[143] Id
.[144] Id
 For more detailed information on these and other trading initiatives, , Environomics, EPA, 
Office of Water, A Summary of U.S. Effluent Trading and Offset Projects (Nov. 1999), 
 (summary of 37 projects) (last visited Apr. 19, 
[145] see
available at http:/
/www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf
,  note 149, at 3.
2003) [hereinafter Environomics]; Powers,  note 13, at 191-193.  A list of eleven trading projects 
supported by EPA can be found, 
(last visited April 19, 2003).   Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, A New Tool for Water Quality:  Making 
Watershed-Based Trading Work for You,  note 13, at 33 (state contacts); Fundamental
Principles,  note 79, at 48 (trading ratios); Richard T. Woodward, 
, http://ageco.tamu.edu/faculty/woodward/
ET.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003) (website with numerous links to trading programs).  A directory of 
contacts for the Environmental Trading Network can be found 
 (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
supra
available at http://www.envtn.org/docs/EPA_kickoff_projects.PDF
See also
supra
supra Effluent Trading: Tradable 
Pollution Permits for Improved Environmental Quality at
available at http://www.envtn.org/cgi-
bin/contacts/display_users.cgi
 Draft Framework,  note 34.[146] supra
 Final Water Quality Trading Policy Statement,  note 11[147] See supra .
 Environomics,  note 145.[148] See supra
 at 8; Telephone Interview by Kirstin Etela with Bill McKee, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health and 
Env’t, Water Quality Control Div., Denver, Colo. (Nov. 9, 2001).  Richard T. 
Woodward, , 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2003) [hereinafter ].
[149] Id.
See also
Lessons About Effluent Trading from A Single Trade at http://ageco.tamu.edu/faculty/
woodward/paps/CaseStudy.pdf Lessons About Effluent Trading
 Environomics,  note 145, at 8.[150] See supra
[151]
See Lessons About Effluent Trading supra
[152] Id.
.  [153] Id
.  [154] Id
 Unless otherwise indicated, information is based on a Telephone Interview by Kirstin Etela with 
Dick Parachini, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health and Env’t, Water Quality Control Div., Denver, Colo. (Nov. 
16, 2001) (on file with author).   Powers,  note 13, at 193-194.
[155]
See also supra
 Environomics,  note 145, at 6.[156] supra
 N.C. Dept. of Env’t & Nat. Res., Nonpoint Source Mgmt. Program, 
, (last visited Apr. 19, 2003); 
Environomics,  note 145, at 26.  Powers,  note 13, at 190.
[157] See Tar-Pamlico Nutrient 
Strategy available at http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/tarpam.htm
supra See also supra
 N.C. Dept. of Env’t & Nat. Res.,  note 157.[158] See supra
 Powers,  note 13, at 190.[159] See  supra
, at 189-190; N.C. Dept. of Env’t & Nat. Res.,  note 157.160 Id. supra
 N.C. Dept. of Env’t & Nat. Res.,  note 157.[161] See supra
, 107  Cong., (June 13, 2002) (testimony of Anne Coan, Natural Res. Director, N.C. Farm 
Bur. Fed.),  (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2003).
[162] See Water Quality Trading – An Innovative Approach to Achieving Water Quality Goals on a 
Watershed Basis: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Transp. & Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Water 
Res. and Env’t th
available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/06-13-02/coan.html
[163] Id.
 Telephone Interview by Kirstin Etela with Linda Stoll, Executive Dir., Fox-Wolf Basin 2000, 
Appleton, Wis. (Nov. 16, 2001) (on file with author).  Powers,  note 13, at 186-188; 
Environomics,  note 145, at 35.
[164]
See also supra
supra
, note 149, at 2; Draft Framework,  note 34, at 5-13.[165] See Lessons About Effluent Trading supra supra
 Wis. Dept. of Natural Res., 
, . (Oct. 2002), 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).  
[166] Fourth Progress Report on the Trading of Water Pollution 
Credits Exec. Summ available at http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/
index.htm
In the report the state analyzes the problems which it encountered in various trading projects, 
and the lessons learned.  It is useful reading.
[167] Id.  
 Telephone Interview by Kirstin Etela with Claire Schary, Office of Innovation, United States 
Environmental Prot. Agency Region 10, Seattle, Wash. (Nov. 9, 2001) (on file with author).   Idaho 
Dept. of Envtl. Quality, , 
 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2003); Idaho Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 
, 
(last visited Apr. 19, 
2003); Idaho Dept. of Envtl. Quality, , 
, 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
[168]
See
Lower Boise River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project available at http://
www.deq.state.id.us/water/tmdls/lowerboise_effluent/lowerboiseriver_effluent.htm
Lower Boise River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project, 
Summary of Participant Recommendation For a Trading Framework available at http://
www.deq.state.id.us/water/tmdls/lowerboise_effluent/effluent_summaryreport.pdf
2d Annual Status Report Lower Boise River Effluent Trading 
Demonstration Project at http://www.deq.state.id.us/water/tmdls/lowerboise_effluent/
Effluent_AR_June02.pdf
 Mich. Admin. Code r. 323.3001-3027 (2002).[169]
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